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can operate virtuously. Machiavelli, on this reading, 
offers a dialectical philosophy that is at odds with 
what has gone before, though it draws upon philo-
sophical tradition. It is against elitist Platonic poli-
tics, Aristotelian teleology, the providentialism of 
Polybius and a restricted classical republicanism that 
excludes the people. Machiavelli embraces instead 
a conflictual structure of reality that allows for 
populism in drawing upon the Epicurean vision of 
Lucretius rather than Aristotelianism and classical 
republicanism.
Reading Machiavelli as a dialectical theorist allows 
for an appreciation of his realist and transformative 
political philosophy. Politics can be read dialectically 
in the past and in the present because supposed 
universal moral truths do not stand aside from the 
changing shapes of political realities. Moreover Del 
Lucchese’s reading incorporates a considered appreci-
ation of historic readings of Machiavelli. Machiavelli’s 
dialectical appreciation of agency, change and differ-
ence is shown to align with aspects of many subse-
quent commentaries. Del Lucchese weaves several 
interpretations of Machiavelli around the story that 
he tells. Hence he makes sense of Hegel’s identifica-
tion of Machiavelli’s nationalism and of Strauss’s 
recognition of Machiavelli’s originality, and shows 
how Althusser and Gramsci can perceive their own 
dialectical forms of Marxism to be prefigured in 
Machiavelli. Questions, however, can be asked of Del 
Lucchese’s rereading of Machiavelli concerning, for 
instance, the influence of Lucretius on Machiavelli, 
which is crucial for the book’s depiction of Machia-
velli as a metaphysician. Of course influence is an 
elusive, tricky concept with which to deal, and what 
we are offered here does not render the concept any 
less elusive than usual. We are not presented with 
evidence of an exceptional and emphatic engagement 
with Lucretius on the part of Machiavelli. Rather, 
Machiavelli is held to have read Lucretius early in his 
life, and key passages in his texts are held to reflect or 
mirror Lucretius. In Del Lucchese’s interpretation of 
Machiavelli, his instrumentalism tends to be played 
down along with the influence of classical humanism 
and Ancient republicanism. Machiavelli, however, 
does draw upon Renaissance republicanism and he 
offers sharp and provocative commentary on how a 
politician can break with moral sentiments. The story 
that is told by the Cambridge School is not simply 
wrong even if it is one-sided, just as Leo Strauss has 
a point in calling Machiavelli ‘evil’. Machiavelli is 
prepared to play a very tough political game in which 
the innocent might be killed. 
Interpretations of classic political theorists are 
inevitably partial. Texts are shaped by the ways in 
which they are interpreted. Texts and contexts are 
neither self-producing nor reducible to the inspira-
tion of a classic author or the force of a set of circum-
stances. What we can ask of an interpretation is that 
it offers a stimulating and plausible reading of past 
texts so that we appreciate how the conceptual world 
of a past thinker relates to the world with which it is 
aligned. We also want to get to grips with what a past 
thinker has to say that is of ongoing significance for 
political reality and philosophical speculation. In this 
regard, Del Lucchese’s reading of Machiavelli is an 
exemplary interpretation. It is a highly readable and 
engaging account of Machiavelli that is both scholarly 
and plausible. Importantly, it shows how Machiavelli 
has much to say about the practice of politics and 
the nature of historical developments in the early 
modern, and indeed the late modern, world. This is 
more than enough to be going on with. 
Gary Browning
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In his Philosophy of Mind, Hegel declares that ‘No Idea 
is so generally recognized as indeterminate, ambigu-
ous, and open to the greatest misconceptions, to 
which therefore it actually falls prey, as the Idea 
of freedom, and no Idea is in common circulation 
with so little consciousness of it.’ Hegel’s motif aptly 
applies to Peter Sloterdijk’s new book. Sloterdijk’s 
book Stress and Freedom is something of a bombastic 
oddity, which seeks to conceive freedom not as an 
agent’s autonomy, or right to self-determination, but 
rather as an act of withdrawal from the social. The 
book, which is based on a speech Sloterdijk gave at the 
Berlin Speeches on Freedom in 2011, is a short medita-
tion on the interconnectedness of freedom and stress. 
It is the relation between these two concepts which 
allows Sloterdijk to argue for an account of freedom as 
the freedom to flee from the social sphere of human 
existence. Sloterdijk’s aim is to provide an ostensibly 
innovative conception of individual freedom that 
is predicated on an immunological conception of 
society. Society for Sloterdijk is a stress-generating 
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machine. His attempt, while certainly theoretically 
interesting, results in a hideous reactionary politics. 
The political implications of Sloterdijk’s text on 
freedom are not unlike Heidegger’s preoccupation 
with the fundamental ontological question of Being 
qua being. One is here reminded of Adorno’s reproach 
to Heidegger in Negative Dialectics: 
Metaphysical reflections that seek to get rid of 
their cultural, indirect elements deny the relation 
of their allegedly pure categories to their social 
substance. They disregard society, but encourage 
its continuation in existing forms, in the forms 
which in turn block both the cognition of truth 
and its realization. 
While Sloterdijk does not encourage the continuation 
of society in its existing form, he does argue for a 
conception of freedom which purposefully severs the 
individual’s link to society. For Sloterdijk, rather than 
seeking to collectively change the material conditions 
of society, his proposed solution is to construct a 
concept of freedom that privileges the individual, 
rather than the collective. Freedom, for Sloterdijk, is 
the freedom to retreat from the social.
From the outset of the book, Sloterdijk’s resent-
ment of collective and shared existence is evident. 
For example, he defines individualism as ‘the life 
form that loosens the embeddedness of individuals in 
collectives, and questions the seemingly immemorial 
absolutism of the shared by assigning to every single 
human the dignity of being absolutely sui generis’. 
He claims that ‘the large-scale political bodies we 
call societies should be understood primarily as 
stress-integrated force fields, or more precisely as 
self-stressing care systems constantly hurtling ahead.’ 
Sloterdijk’s thesis is that human societies operate 
by generating stress on a mass scale. Societies are 
only able to exist in so far as they maintain a certain 
level of unease among their inhabitants. Modern 
media outlets, capitalism’s unmitigated productive 
force, the exploitation of workers, and so on – all 
of these factors of contemporary social life stress 
us out. Sloterdijk is confident about this definition 
of society because he argues that the very stability 
of society is not guaranteed; a point he takes to be 
proved by the prevalence of the word ‘sustainability’ 
in the dominant cultural discourse. Our obsession 
with creating a more sustainable way of life is not 
incidental, Sloterdijk claims; it is rather a reaction 
to, and a symptom of, the inherent restlessness of 
our modern world. Hence, societies are to be under-
stood as stress-inducing ‘force fields’ that surround 
its inhabitants completely. 
Sloterdijk’s inspiration for his conception of 
freedom is mainly found in Rousseau’s Reveries of the 
Solitary Walker. This is the focus of the second section 
of the book. In this seldom-read text, Rousseau 
describes his walking experience in 1776–77 on St 
Peter’s Island in the middle of Lake Biel. It is the 
entry for the ‘Fifth Walk’ which fascinates Sloterdijk. 
There, Rousseau gives his contemplative account of 
experiencing a state of solitude so refined that all 
earthly and social pressures dissolve and momentarily 
wither away. Sloterdijk refers to this as the ‘freedom 
of a dreamer in a waking state’. For Sloterdijk, then, 
Rousseau’s experience ushers in a new understanding 
of freedom, which refers 
to a state of exquisite unusability in which the in-
dividual is entirely with themselves, but mostly de-
tached from their everyday identity. In the freedom 
of the reverie, the individual is far removed from 
‘society’, but also detached from their own person 
as woven into the social fabric. They leave both 
things behind: the world of collective themes of 
concern and themselves as part of it. Hence an 
individual becomes free through the conquest of 
carefreeness.
This carefree subject, according to Sloterdijk, is one 
without any objective purpose, creative endeavour or 
political opinion. It is a subject with nothing to say or 
do. Sloterdijk’s free subject is useless, and that’s the 
entire point. To be useful presupposes some connec-
tion to the social dimension of human existence, and 
Sloterdijk’s withdrawn subject flees from this exact 
connection.
If modern societies are nothing but stress-
generators, then Rousseau’s discovery is the only form 
of temporary relief available. Sloterdijk acknowledges 
that there are two general types of unfreedom: (i) 
political oppression; and (ii) repression by a reality 
that is external to the subject. Unsurprisingly, Sloter-
dijk spends little time contemplating the first form 
of unfreedom and mostly focuses on the second. He 
draws upon Lacan’s concept of ‘the Real’ to suggest 
that the modern social order is inherently oppres-
sive, traumatic and seemingly inescapable, save for 
the flash of freedom discovered by Rousseau: ‘the 
subjectivity released while fleeing from pursuit by the 
real – the pure feeling of existence removed from all 
topics – reached, just this once, the pole of complete 
freedom from stress.’ 
Sloterdijk thinks that in our contemporary situa-
tion we can neither live in absolute carefreeness as a 
withdrawn subject nor dismiss Rousseau’s discovery. 
Where the individual experience of withdrawnness 
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is concerned, Sloterdijk demonstrates a characteristi-
cally reactionary attitude towards collective forms of 
political action. Repeating an all-too-pervasive neo-
liberal trope, he claims that Rousseau’s concept of 
the General Will, famously formulated in The Social 
Contract, ‘was the logical nucleus of the socialist 
fascisms that dueled against their nationalist rivals 
during the twentieth century’. He goes on to assert 
that this only 
proves that even distinguished thinkers do not 
always gain their most far-reaching insights in the 
right order. Rousseau should have retracted his 
doctrine of volonté générale in light of his experi-
ence in Lake Biel. His failure to do so was disas-
trous for the modern world, in which nothing is as 
irresistible as a wrong idea in the heads that seem 
only to have been waiting for it. 
What follows this attack on the general will is 
a haphazard and hasty link between the Reign of 
Terror and the Chinese and Russian revolutions. 
Indeed, for Sloterdijk ‘the deeds of the Khmer Rouge 
likewise had undeniable Rousseauist origins’, and 
‘Gaddafi’s Libyan socialism brought to light aspects 
of the phantasm that the will of the whole should be 
unanimous.’ 
Analogous to Heidegger’s account of authentic 
Dasein, Sloterdijk claims that the experience of the 
fleeing or released subject 
never maintains the stance of inaccessibility to 
the real in the long term. As soon as it discovers 
its freedom, it simultaneously discovers a virtually 
boundless accessibility within itself to calls from 
the real. Because of its availability, which reaches a 
maximum by disengaging inwards, it independent-
ly finds its way back into the objective – provided 
it is not kept within a false I-construct by neurosis, 
as was the case with Rousseau. 
Sloterdijk concludes the book with an appeal to the 
noble disposition of the free subject. The free subject 
is noble because it is committed to alleviating the 
stress of others through virtuous acts of generosity, 
for ‘whoever acts out of freedom revolts against mean-
ness they can no longer bear to see.’ This ‘meanness’ 
includes both political oppression and the repressive 
nature of reality. Curiously enough, Sloterdijk calls 
his theory of freedom a type of liberalism, one that 
is ‘a synonym for generosity’.
Stress and Freedom abides by Sloterdijk’s philosoph-
ical project, his Spheres trilogy, in that he advances 
an understanding of society that is decidedly immu-
nological. Society is not only stressful, but it will 
continue to create and disseminate stressors. The 
only solace from social stress is a form of individual 
freedom that borders on the ascetic and the aristo-
cratic. But by opposing the concept of freedom as 
the collective right to self-determination, Sloterdijk’s 
thesis reinforces the most reactionary tendencies of 
the status quo. Gone are any attempts at restruc-
turing or refashioning the economic order and our 
social institutions, gone is the demand for universal 
emancipation by way of altering our material condi-
tions, and, perhaps most dangerously of all, gone is 
the idea of freedom as self-determination, the very 
germ of radical emancipation itself.
Borna Radnik
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Rousseau’s Second Discourse is long and intricate – 
some would say even tortuous – and first-time readers 
often get lost. In my experience (having taught the 
text for a number of years), part of the problem is 
recognizing the kind of argument that Rousseau 
mounts, or even recognizing that there is an argu-
ment at all, rather than a general polemic against 
the ills of civilization. A frequent and wholly under-
standable complaint from students is that Rousseau 
appears to assert different and even contradictory 
claims at different points in the text. What exactly 
is Rousseau saying about inequality? Is the focus 
of the text inequality or is this only a landmark en 
route to a more fundamental problem: the possibility 
of autonomy or authenticity in the modern world? 
To compound matters, there is the purported influ-
ence of the work on figures like Kant, Hegel, Marx, 
Nietzsche, and Adorno and Horkheimer. If the Second 
Discourse is an important source for works like The 
Phenomenology of Spirit, The 1844 Manuscripts, The 
Genealogy of Morals and The Dialectic of Enlighten-
ment, then it should be possible not just to trace 
this influence but to develop an authentically Rous-
seauian standpoint to compare and contrast with 
these seminal statements on modernity. If any text in 
the canon deserves painstaking reconstruction, then 
it is surely this one. 
Frederick Neuhouser’s background in German Ide-
alism greatly facilitates his achievement in Rousseau’s 
